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Abstract 
 Security models and security economics have been 
separate developments for a long time. Models represent the 
organisation under scrutiny with possible attack paths, and 
security economics covers the effect and cost of attacks and 
counter-measures. This inhibits progress in decision support 
for security investment. The navigation metaphor merges 
these two concepts: navigation on security models can 
identify optimal attacker and defender decisions for multi-
step attacks, based on “maps” of the system being studied. 
Routes on the map represent attacks on the system. 
Economic optimisation analyses can identify the most 
efficient routes for gaining access to certain targets from the 
point of view of an attacker; this insight is used to optimise 
the defences on these routes from the point of view of the 
defender. In this article, we discuss the achievements and 
the challenges of the navigation metaphor in cyber security.   
Keywords: attack navigators, attacker profiles, navigation 
metaphor, security economics, visualisation  
1  The navigation metaphor 
In the physical world, navigation is a well-understood concept: if you want to get 
from A to B, you can use a navigation system to plan your route. Such systems can 
help you to optimise your behaviour by finding the most efficient route, and can even 
adapt dynamically when everybody takes the same route. However, navigation 
systems may also be used for other purposes. In order to prevent you from reaching a 
particular destination, I could identify your most likely routes and sabotage them, 
thereby significantly affecting your travel time, or even the likelihood of your 
arriving at all. 
This is precisely the idea of the “navigation metaphor” for cyber security, which 
is being developed in the TRESPASS project. By identifying the most efficient routes 
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for gaining access to certain targets from the point of view of an attacker, the 
defences on these routes can be optimised for the benefit of the defender. This 
combines models of security architectures (maps) with economic optimisation 
strategies (route planning), integrating these different strands of security research. 
The navigation metaphor, in conjunction with insights from risk management and 
visual design, provides a very powerful security decision support tool. Specifically, 
the navigation metaphor supports the economic analysis and visualisation of multi-
step attacks: just as successive roads lead to a single physical location, so ordered 
combinations of actions are required to reach the attacker’s goal. By using navigation 
as an analogy, it becomes easier to motivate and explain security investment 
decisions to a wide audience. 
In this article, we introduce the navigation metaphor in cyber security and discuss 
its strengths and limitations. We do this by comparison with different views and steps 
in real-world maps and navigation: 
• a satellite view which offers realistic aerial pictures, but not the underlying 
infrastructure;  
• the map view, which shows the underlying infrastructure and enables route 
calculation, but does not show the actual look of your surroundings;  
• route calculation, which optimises travel to a specific goal, as well as 
strategies for blocking such travel.  
We illustrate our techniques with a case study on online services via interactive 
TV, as a running example. 
2  Satellite Images 
The satellite view in navigation systems provides an overview of the natural 
surroundings. This direct mapping between the local environment and the display 
presented to the driver, promotes navigation and orientation, supporting the 
widespread adoption of navigation systems. Obtaining satellite images is relatively 
easy; creating a map from them is not, especially when travel is on foot or by bike. 
While the big, public roads are well known and easy to detect on the image, smaller, 
private tracks and paths may be hidden by vegetation, buildings, or even clouds, or 
may have been forgotten and are only found by chance. 
In navigation systems for cyber security, the satellite image corresponds to the 
external view of the organisation, its divisions, computers, infrastructure. As with its 
geographical counterpart, some of these components are visible, others may be 
private, others again may exist but have been forgotten. As in geographical navigation 
systems, the navigation metaphor for cyber security depends on the collection of 
contextual information. Acquiring such information is the first step in analysing the 
security of a system with the navigation metaphor. 
As a running example, we will look into a TRESPASS project case study 
exploring the delivery of home-based services via a TV interface. Our case study 
partner, despite its small footprint, achieves significant social impact by delivering 
services through a range of partners in different sectors. The development of this case 
study illustrates the value of using attack navigator maps and visualisations to support 
service planning. This process includes mapping multiple partner relationships, with 
their complex inter-dependencies and diverse security implications. 
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In our case study, the enterprise architecture modelling language ArchiMate [5] 
was first used to map the digital services, in collaboration with our case study 
partners. The resulting diagrams (“maps”) were easily understood by stakeholders, 
but needed greater focus on social, organisational and partnership features. The 
partners felt that the resulting map lacked essential elements of the system. 
In the next session, we aimed to establish the satellite view of the proposed 
service instead. We conducted a pre-study briefing with senior managers, exploring 
the organisation’s goals, culture, business model, and projects past, present and 
future. From these discussions, a set of security concerns emerged relating to 
untrusted behaviours by both users and outsiders. Building on text-based target 
graphs developed from the results of the pre-study, we asked each participant to 
consider a typical service that they work on and to construct a drawing of how they 
would undertake a typical data management task. 
Subsequently, we introduced LEGO bricks to the case study service design 
participants. This led them to co-construct a rich multi-perspectival picture of data-
sharing as a part of the service [6]. We asked participants to model (using the colours 
and language of ArchiMate) the central actors (yellow bricks), infrastructure (green 
bricks), data (blue bricks), and locations (pink tiles) (Fig. 1). The group agreed on a 
narrative associated with the modelling process, and the weighting and positioning 
(and repositioning) of elements of the model. 
The satellite view of the proposed service showed regions of trust between actors 
in the modelled environment, and data flows crossing the boundaries of these regions. 
Actors were modelled as LEGO avatars to represent the central actors and the control 
strengths of selected points along data-paths. Participatory techniques included 
mapping (the domain target), sequencing (order of linked events), listing, placing (the 
relevance of previously established values), comparing (the viewpoints of different 
characters), and linking (assessing the implications of actions upon different actors). 
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Figure 1: Digital collage of the results from two LEGO participatory mapping sessions. Case 
study participants designing an IPTV home-banking service used colour-coded LEGO bricks 
and figures to map the service infrastructure and the role of business actors. Two sessions are 
summarised here in a digital collage, showing the relationships that emerged. In the central 
loop, the service is carried forward, clockwise, starting with the client and moving to the 
provider and their business partners. Below, in a different loop, the banking platform assists 
cloud-based transactions made with a card. Above, the client receives income. 
The satellite views for our navigation metaphor can be refined over time; in a 
second LEGO session, the group reflected upon and remodelled the weaker parts of 
the service design, adding bricks where necessary. The nature of actors was 
represented by avatars to show their business role, world view and degree of 
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influence, some being diminutive and others overbearing (Fig. 1). Lines of defence 
were added to show relationships and areas of vulnerability. 
A particular benefit of three-dimensional physical modelling is the ease of 
incorporating annotations, while the group keeps track of any working assumptions. 
Apart from the use of avatars, the group developed colour-coding for different types 
of relationships and data-flows, sometimes increasing the height of defences for 
greater control strength. A key feature of the resulting model is the ability to view it 
from every side and track all the risk implications for each of the participating entities 
from their own perspective. This is vitally important in smaller, more flexible 
organisations which rely heavily on working in partnership in what have been called 
relational services [3], where human relationships effect the continuation and 
extension of the service. 
3  Maps 
The satellite view of an organisation developed in the first phase forms the basis for 
the navigator map. The goal of the first step was to obtain a precise satellite image, 
revealing as many elements as possible. The goal of the second step is to translate this 
image into a formalised map for cyber security navigation. 
There is quite a history of map-style network models in security. Trees may be 
used to model the infrastructure by representing containment, in the sense that a 
computer is located in a room in a building in the world. In many domains, and also 
in security, infrastructure tree models are not sufficiently expressive to deal with the 
real world. Information is not contained within one clear boundary or perimeter, like 
a safe or an offline machine, but can be accessed via many possible routes. A network 
model (graph or map) is therefore more suitable in such cases, although it comes at 
the cost of more complex analysis (e.g. [1]). 
However, such network models have generally been limited to the technical parts 
of an organisation’s infrastructure, typically representing computer networks and 
hops of a hacker from one node to another. Focusing only on the computer network 
limits the analysis possibilities, just as navigating only along highways limits 
navigation possibilities. Many attacks contain some form of social engineering and/or 
physical access, and it is therefore vital to include humans and physical locations in 
the map, with their role in obtaining access. The navigation metaphor introduced in 
this paper uses such “socio-technical” network models (Fig. 2) as maps, which form 
the basis for navigating to the goal of an attack [8]. These maps are essentially graphs 
with nodes and connections, enabling the analysis of routes. In the Fig. 2, one can 
recognise formalised elements from the Internet service case study, such as locations 
(bank, home), digital infrastructure (computers and connections) and actors with 
possessions (Alice, Charlie). 
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Figure 2: Example network model (map) for socio-technical security. Entities are represented 
as boxes, and data as circles. Dashed boxes represent access control policies. 
Developing a map from the satellite view is largely based on domain knowledge 
of members of the organisation, supported by software tools that assist in the 
translation according to the rules of the map formalism. Although some information 
will be lost in the translation from satellite image to map, the mathematical structure 
of a map enables quantitative analyses and optimisations. 
Network models allow users to model entities and relations within their access 
control space, independently of attacker goals. For example, rather than thinking 
about vulnerabilities on a particular database, the user would first map the 
infrastructure around this database, including digital, physical, and social access. This 
decoupling of attack opportunities and modelling is crucial for ensuring that no 
relevant attack opportunities are overlooked. As geographical maps represent 
different entities and their connections, cyber security maps represent different assets 
and possible activities. This information forms the basis for maps that can represent 
“attack navigation” in socio-technical systems – identifying possible attacks by 
picking a starting state and a target node on the map.  
7 
4  Routes 
With geographical maps, navigation amounts to identifying and optimising the means 
to reach a goal using different modes of transportation and routes; in the attack 
navigator, this amounts to identifying and optimising ways in which an attacker can 
reach a particular asset [8]. This analysis is based on assumptions of economic 
rationality: short and cheap routes are better for the attacker. (Long and costly ones 
are obviously better from a defender point of view.) 
Some kind of route planning can already start from the satellite view. Once the 
most important aspects, such as the main actors, locations, and assets have been 
identified and agreed upon by all participants, the environment can then be explored 
from many different perspectives. In particular, physical models enable the 
stakeholders to move actors around physically. This enables stakeholders to evaluate 
the attacker perspective and strategy in relation to future users of the service, 
exploring the strategic and economic implications of different relationships. These 
include the potential for financial abuse of users of the system, economic risks posed 
by rivals and even partner organisations, as well as more standard technical and 
communications security risks. 
More formal analysis is possible based on the map, in particular answering the 
question of optimal routes for the attacker. This is equivalent to planning a journey by 
identifying the destination, and generating a sequence of actions to perform to reach 
that destination. In comparison to road navigation, attack navigation deals not only 
with where the attacker can go, but also with what he can take along, for example 
credentials. Therefore, an optimal route for the attacker may involve visiting different 
places or people, obtaining credentials from those, and then reaching the information 
that can be disclosed with those credentials. In this sense, “has-access-to” is a 
fundamental relation in the navigation system: the attacker has certain access in the 
beginning, and may gain access to new places, people, and credentials by his actions. 
However, such access is not cost-free. Travelling on a navigator map, like in the 
real world, costs something. This “distance” can be represented as cost, time, or 
likelihood of success/failure, associated with connections and access control policies 
on the map. All of these constitute difficulty metrics that say something about the 
expected effort an adversary has to expend in order to gain access. For example, 
opening a door by force may take 3 minutes, but with a key it may only take 10 
seconds. As well as time, money (costs) may be used as annotation, but also for 
example likelihood of detection. 
4.1  Vulnerability functions 
The route proposed by a navigation system depends on settings such as car speed and 
efficiency preferences: if you have a faster car, you may want to take a different 
route, depending on infrastructure constraints such as road condition and speed limits. 
An obvious example is a shorter route that is only accessible to 4WD vehicles. The 
infrastructure properties plus the properties of your car determine how much time a 
particular part of the route will take you (with infinite for impossible), and thereby 
also determine the optimal overall route(s). 
In security analysis, this corresponds to the relationship between the system 
properties represented in the map and attacker properties, which together determine 
properties of attack steps, such as required time and likelihood of success. Such a 
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basic separation between attacker properties and system properties has been proposed 
in the Factor Analysis of Information Risk taxonomy [14], whereby the likelihood of 
success of an attack step is determined by threat capability and  control strength. The 
attack navigator uses vulnerability functions describing a relation between the threat 
capability and the likelihood of success to represent “resistance” of system 
components to attacks. In essence, this is a calculation of action properties from 
agent properties, similar to the way in which the outcome in many games is 
determined by the “skill levels” of the characters plus a source of randomness (dice). 
From a more scientific point of view, item response theory and Elo ratings (e.g., of 
chess players) achieve similar conceptual benefits [13]. 
4.2  Attacker profiles 
The separation of attacker properties from system properties implies that attacker 
profiles are required in addition to navigator maps. Attacker profiles [2] are 
equivalent to individual car details entered into a navigation system; they specify 
attacker attributes such as skill and budget, and can be used to identify feasible 
attacks and their properties. 
Within the TRESPASS project, we have developed several different strategies for 
specifying attacker profiles. For example, we can assume that attackers will be unable 
to execute attack steps where the difficulty level exceeds their skill level [9]. In a 
more quantitative setting, we can estimate the likelihood of success based on the 
difference between difficulty and skill [13]. Additional constraints may be imposed 
by the time and budget available to the attacker. In contrast to the skill constraints, 
these constraints are “additive”, in the sense that the attacker cannot execute attacks 
for which the sum of the costs of the steps exceeds the available budget. In a visual 
sense, skill or budget levels can be represented by the length of a bar, a number of 
blocks/items, or simply a number. When the attacker takes an action, his skill has to 
be higher than the corresponding difficulty, and his budget will be decreased by the 
cost of the action. 
Although time, budget, and skill tell us something about the adversary, they do 
not provide any information about the attacker motivation or strategy. Not all 
attackers with the same time, budget, and skill will aim at the same attack vectors. 
Therefore, the question of the difficulty of attack paths should be complemented by 
the interest of the attacker in such attack paths, typically expressed in terms of the 
expected utility, which in turn depends on attacker motivation. Finally, attackers may 
not even choose the paths with the highest expected utility, for example because they 
have limited information, which forces us to make adversary strategy (or lack thereof) 
explicit [12]. 
4.3  Routing and weakest links 
Using attacker profiles and the map, the attack navigator computes possible routes for 
an attacker to reach the goal of an attack. Sets of possible attack paths can be 
represented as trees. Attack trees [10] identify the different options available for an 
attacker to achieve a goal, and the properties of such attack paths, for example 
likelihood of success, cost, and time. Using extensions to this framework, defences 
can be added as well (attack-defence trees). Unlike existing attack tree frameworks, 
navigator maps can be used to generate an attack tree for each combination of goal 
and attacker, making the analysis more flexible. Whereas traditional attack trees do 
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not keep track of the system components involved in attack steps, attack navigators 
do exactly this. 
This also provides a definition for what is called “weakest link”: the weakness of 
a link (system component) is determined by how much the utility for adversaries 
decreases when you remove the link (component) from the system, calculated over 
different possible attacker goals. In other words, if you remove an element or link 
from the system, how much more difficult or costly would reaching a goal become 
for the attacker, in comparison to the expected gain upon reaching the goal?  Rather 
than setting a predefined goal that an attacker would be interested in, this becomes a 
multi-asset question, basically evaluating which assets the attacker can gain access to 
with positive expected utility, and how [11]. This is an economic analysis of 
contributions of system components to attackers’ expected utility. 
From the perspective of an attacker, the generated attack trees also provide 
information that can be used to determine the optimal attack strategy, which in turn, 
from the defender point of view, may be used to determine which attack vectors are 
more likely, and where to direct investments. Based on the most efficient routes for 
gaining access to certain targets from the point of view of an attacker, we can then 
optimise the defences on these routes from the point of view of the defender. 
4.4  Routes in the Internet Service 
In contrast to navigation systems, we can use both the satellite view and the map of 
an organisation for identifying routes, that is possible attacks. While for the satellite 
view and the map this can be a manual process, it can also be (partially) automated by 
use of dedicated tools on navigator maps [8]. For the Internet service case study we 
developed an initial attack tree, annotated with values relating to the different attack 
steps. As with standard navigation systems, the attack navigator can visualise the 
attacks as routes through the model. However, the project has also developed new 
techniques for visualising vulnerability in such attack trees based on parameters such 
as difficulty, time, cost and probability per attack step, thereby visualising economic 
aspects of the attacks. This approach also allows for navigating specific threats, by 
highlighting important paths, zooming in, and reordering the tree (Fig. 3), each 
visualisation showing a different perspective on the same scenario. Visualisations of 
routes thus communicate the attacker perspective to the defenders. Based on such 
visualisations, stakeholders can identify the weak links in their system, which may 
suggest possible improvements by revising the architecture. 
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Figure 3: Radial attack tree for the Internet service case study. Colour, transparency and 
thickness of each edge is based on difficulty, required time and likelihood of success of the 
corresponding attack step. 
Visualisations are an essential part of navigation systems, and also in the attack 
navigator they provide a greater level of understanding, as well as a clear means of 
communicating with the organisation. It also fostered a greater sense of ownership 
within the partner organisation, who expressed a desire to retain and update the 
emerging LEGO model even between workshop sessions. Their enthusiasm is 
typified by this quote: “I am in absolute awe at how you have managed to visualise 
and portray our sessions. It is very exciting to see our organisation all down on paper 
and at the same time very challenging in terms of next steps.” They also highlighted 
how “mapping out where we are, where we want to go, how we’ll get there clarifies 
all sorts of things.” In this respect, the mapping and navigation process provides a 
bridge between the detailed data gathering and analysis processes required to support 
sound security decision-making, and the commercial imperative to present key issues 
in a clear and concise form when dealing with senior decision-makers. 
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5  Optimisation 
Once the attacker routes are known, economic analysis can answer different 
questions, in particular optimal strategies for both attacker (routes) and defender 
(“roadblocks”, i.e. controls to make routes more difficult). In particular, the effects of 
changes in the map (added controls) on optimal attacker strategies can be 
investigated, thereby providing a metric for the effectiveness of controls. This applies 
to digital architectures (such as cloud infrastructure) as well as socio-technical 
systems (such as the Internet service above). 
We have applied the navigation metaphor in several additional case studies. For 
the Estonian Internet voting system, we estimated costs of individual attack steps, for 
example based on black market prices of infected machines. The optimal route 
depends on what an attacker is actually trying to achieve: changing a single vote, or 
changing the complete election result. Thus, we were able to map the required 
number of votes against the optimal strategy, and the cost of this strategy for that 
number of votes [15]. Using the navigation metaphor, one can compare such results 
against alternative architectures, such as an equivalent paper voting system. Also, one 
could specify requirements in terms of the minimum cost for an adversary to hijack 
one seat in parliament (or ten seats). 
Another case study concerns fraud opportunities in telecommunication services, 
where the maps consist of value models of service architectures, and the routes of 
combinations of services that lead to monetary gain for an attacker [7]. For example, 
rogue telecommunication operators abroad may arrange a high volume of calls to 
their numbers, in order to obtain interconnection fees from honest operators. The 
analyses show possible adversary strategies, in terms of e.g. the required number of 
calls for making a profit. Again, changes to the architecture can be investigated in 
order to reduce the utility of adversaries. These different implementation variants of 
the metaphor illustrate its power in economic analyses of security. 
6  The TRESPASS vision 
Based on the methods and cases above, we believe the navigation metaphor offers 
great potential for further integration of economic and system models in cyber 
security, as well as visual designs. Navigation systems perform economic 
optimisation in terms of shortening travel times for travellers. Attack navigators do 
the same for potential cyber attackers, but now it becomes relevant how defenders can 
change the map. This combination of security architecture models and security 
economics enables new research directions as well as practical applications. 
The navigation metaphor makes it easy to explain economic considerations of 
cyber security decisions to stakeholders, as shown in the Internet service case. If I 
change something on the map, how would the situation change for the attacker, from 
an economic point of view?  This is basically a minimax optimisation [4] supported 
by the map. The combination of a map (model of the infrastructure) and an attacker 
profile also enables “adversary course of action” type reasoning for different types of 
attackers, providing flexibility under changing threat environments. If the threat 
environment changes, one simply re-runs the analysis with a different attacker profile. 
These are the key innovations compared to the state of the art. 
It is notoriously hard to compare risk assessment approaches, because their 
effectiveness is ultimately determined by the losses due to real attacks. Even if one 
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could measure this, this would beg the question whether the attacks that actually 
occurred are representative for the threat environment of the system. For example, if 
method A predicts an annual loss expectancy of € 1 million, and method B predicts € 
5 million, then what is the best method if the actual average annual loss after 5 years 
is € 2 million?  Acknowledging these comparison difficulties, these are the main 
advantages we see of the navigation metaphor with respect to existing approaches: 
1. The navigation metaphor enables a better conceptual understanding of weak 
links in a system, thereby supporting investment decisions;  
2. The navigation metaphor stimulates consideration of different attacker profiles 
for the same system, acknowledging different economic strategies / utility 
functions of attackers;  
3. The navigation metaphor invites the user to take the perspective of an attacker 
looking for opportunities, enabling new forms of learning;  
4. The navigation metaphor stimulates innovation in visualisation of security 
economics and risk.  
Obviously the navigation metaphor does not solve all problems of security risk 
management. Firstly, there are limits to the level of detail that can be represented on a 
map. Technical details of attacks, such as manipulations of code or program flow, 
need different types of analyses and visualisations. Maps can still show high-level 
access paths for gaining the required access, e.g. via different servers, via infected 
USB drives, or via social engineering. Secondly, the navigation metaphor does not 
solve the problem of data availability. Although our work helps stakeholders map 
their systems, there may still be uncertainties or errors in their input, which can 
propagate to the results. Links with security economics are important in terms of 
identifying costs of actions and impact of successful attacks. Thirdly, analysis of the 
maps, like many economic frameworks, depends on models of adversary choices, 
which can be complicated to construct and validate. We are currently investigating 
probabilistic models for this purpose. 
The navigation metaphor is most useful in identifying attack opportunities in 
complex socio-technical systems, where attacks consist of multiple steps of which the 
relation is not immediately obvious. The strength of the metaphor lies in representing 
heterogeneous elements in a single formalism and analysis. By contrast, finding 
attack opportunities for individual system components, be they human or technical, 
should be identified by different types of tools. 
On a more strategic level, we have been asked whether attack navigator tools 
could give advantages to attackers as well, in particular when methods are published 
and tools are open source. Ultimately, this relates to security by obscurity: can we 
deflect attackers by withholding information about system design?  Even if the 
answer were positive, it would probably be more effective to protect the system 
design data, rather than tools for analysis of the system for optimal attack paths, based 
on the navigation metaphor. 
We see the following key challenges for the coming years:  
1. Further integration of different types of difficulty metrics for use in navigation 
analysis, such as CVSS (common vulnerability scoring system) or CWSS 
(common weakness scoring system) values, but also the results of social 
engineering experiments;  
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2. More advanced methods for taking attacker motivation and strategy into 
account in the analysis, in addition to “resource” properties such as skill, 
budget, and available time;  
3. “App-style” interfaces for map development and maintenance, as well as 
“first-person” visualisation of routes.  
We hope to be able to contribute to these challenges in the final stages of 
the TRESPASS project. In doing so, we aim at further improving stakeholder 
understanding of economic reasoning and investment decisions in cyber security, 
based on a well-understood metaphor. Whereas geographic navigation is about 
optimisation of reaching a goal on earth, cyber defence is about making such 
optimisation harder for the attacker in cyberspace. For our stakeholders, the 
navigation metaphor enables grasping and rethinking this fundamental economic 
relation between attackers and defenders. 
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